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The purpose of this paper is to ascertain how upward accountability processes can be enabling in, or 
constraining to, the effective deployment of development aid funding.  
Methodology: 
The paper derives its primary insights from in-depth interviews and focus groups with non-
governmental organization (NGO) fieldworkers working and delivering development aid in Northern 




The fieldworkers’ perception of upward accountability was mainly one of external control, in response 
to which they enacted a skilful form of compliance accountability. This perception of control failed to 
stifle their initiative and intrinsic commitment to beneficiaries. The fieldworkers craved ‘conversations 
for accountability’, in which they had a voice in the development of upward accountability metrics, 
thereby enabling them to fulfil their sense of felt responsibility to beneficiaries. While aspects of 
‘conversations for accountability’ were emerging in fieldworker-funder interactions, it was unclear to 
what extent funders were committed to further advancing them. Overall, our analysis unveils how felt 
responsibility mediates for, and partly diminishes, the perceived negative impacts on aid effectiveness 
of upward accountability processes informed by a focus on control.  
 
Originality: 
We examine the potential of upward accountability processes using in-depth analyses of the actual 
experiences of those involved in delivering NGO services at the grassroots level. We contribute to 
emerging work in this vein by enriching our understanding of local constituencies’ experiences of 
accountability processes more generally, especially the impact these mechanisms have on NGO 
operational activities. We also unveil the mediating role fieldworkers’ ‘felt responsibility’ to 





Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), NGO accountability, upward accountability, performance 
measurement, felt responsibility, felt accountability, management control 
 





Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the development aid sector typically 
receive funding from a number of governmental and private donors and channel this into providing 
welfare and other aid services to disadvantaged communities in developing countries (Ferguson et al., 
2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2010). The scale and potential impact of this aid is immense. Taking 
just Official Development Assistance (aid provided by governments and other private agencies to 
support the economic, environmental, social and political development of developing countries), in 
2013, net Official Development Assistance from governments of the 28 countries that are members of 
the OECD’s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Development Assistance 
Committee came to US$134.8 billion1 (OECD, 2014). It is widely claimed that the effective 
deployment of this aid, often via NGOs, can dramatically alter the life experiences of hundreds of 
millions of the poorest inhabitants in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2008; United Nations, 
2011).  
Accountability mechanisms and processes are seen as essential to both assessing and 
enhancing the effectiveness with which this aid funding is spent (Ebrahim 2005; KPMG, 2010). 
Upward accountability mechanisms involve reporting on NGO actions and outcomes to providers of 
funds, and usually follow processes and formats prescribed by NGO funders (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 
2008; Ebrahim, 2003; Ebrahim, 2009). Many large NGO funders have recognised that more effective 
deployment of their aid funding requires their upward accountability mechanisms to be flexible 
enough to allow communication of unexpected insights from the grassroots levels (where the aid is 
delivered) and a two-way flow of information. These funders have made commitments to ensuring that 
the upward accountability procedures they require funded NGOs to follow will enable active 
engagement with fieldworkers and beneficiaries.  
Within this context, the aim of this paper is to ascertain how upward accountability processes 
can be enabling in, or constraining to, the effective deployment of development aid funding. We 
approach this question from the perspective of the experiences of grassroots fieldworkers in interacting 
with upward accountability mechanisms in varying situations, and in seeking to adapt to these 
processes in a manner that will enable them to deliver the most effective services to the communities 
they serve.   
More specifically, to address this aim we present and analyse the results of a field study 
conducted among thirty non-governmental development organization (NGDO) fieldworkers working 
and delivering development aid within impoverished communities in Northern Ghana, West Africa. 
These fieldworkers are the key individuals involved in deploying and assessing the use of 
development aid at local community/grassroots level (Awio et al., 2011). The data analysis focuses on 
the experiences of the fieldworkers regarding the upward accountability processes they use to 
communicate their performance to funders and the impact these experiences have on their work with 
NGO beneficiaries. We focus in particular on the fieldworkers’ experiences of funders’ upward 
performance reporting requirements and the perceived impact compliance with these requirements has 
on the on-the-ground effectiveness of NGO development interventions.  
The paper contributes to the literature by extending and developing prior research 
investigating NGO upward accountability processes. Prior research has questioned the ability of 
upward accountability processes to enable more effective as opposed to efficient spending of aid 
funding (Everett and Friesen, 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007, 2008; Rahaman et al., 2010). It is 
                                                             
1 Net Official Development Assistance as a share of the combined gross national income (GNI) of Development Assistance 
Committee member countries was 0.3% (OECD, 2014). 
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often claimed that upward accountability operates in an overly constraining manner thereby rendering 
assessments of and improvements in, aid effectiveness more problematic (Awio et al., 2011; Ebrahim, 
2009; Rahaman et al., 2010). However, researchers have only recently commenced examining the 
potential of upward accountability processes using in-depth analyses of the actual experiences of those 
involved in delivering NGO services at the grassroots level – where the degree of adaptation of NGO 
provision to local contexts is experienced in practice, and where much of the knowledge for upward 
accountability processes is generated (see, Awio et al., 2011; Dixon et al., 2006). We contribute to this 
emerging work by deepening our understanding of local constituencies’ experiences of accountability 
processes more generally, in particular the impact these mechanisms have on their operational 
activities.   
The findings of this study unveil continuing tensions between funders’ desires for global 
control and learning, and the need for local flexibility by fieldworkers (Hall, 2014; Rahaman et al., 
2010). Fieldworkers were frustrated by the perceived limited reciprocity in information sharing 
between funders and NGDOs within upward accountability mechanisms. They craved what Fry (1995) 
terms ‘conversations for accountability’ where they were offered a voice in co-constructing and 
evaluating performance metrics with funders that could align funder aims with both their ‘felt 
responsibility’ to serve beneficiaries, and their on-the-ground experiences. While the upward 
accountability processes were often experienced as controlling, the expectation from a policy and 
academic literature perspective that this could stifle individual fieldworker initiative was not borne out 
by our analysis. Rather, the fieldworkers were stimulated by their strong sense of felt responsibility 
towards beneficiaries (Ebrahim, 2003; Fry, 1995; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015), and skillfully 
worked with and around the formal upward accountability processes in order to adapt to local 
contingencies while complying with the funder accountability requirements. In vocational-type roles, 
such as those often undertaken by NGDO fieldworkers, individuals may feel more intrinsically 
responsible for their actions and actively seek to find ways of working around accountability processes 
that seem misguided. Our analysis suggests that a sense of felt responsibility towards beneficiaries 
may mediate for, and even diminish the perceived negative impacts of mandatory upward 
accountability processes on aid effectiveness.  
Our analysis also uncovers how fieldworkers are highly pragmatic in the manner in which they 
work around upward accountability requirements. Because the discipline of reporting against pre-
determined measures cannot be avoided, as funders have the power to dictate activities, fieldworkers 
constantly seek to devise local solutions to absorb the challenges created by funder reporting 
requirements. In effect, the fieldworkers are shown to possess a certain level of agency in that they 
also have power, in certain circumstances, to create workable solutions in subtle ways to manage their 
performance. Paradoxically, these solutions often draw upon the nascent enabling characteristics of 
upward accountability processes. Coupling a more enabling upward accountability with the felt 
responsibility of fieldworkers within ‘conversations for accountability’ was widely viewed as crucial 
to further enhancing the effectiveness of aid delivery. Some funders were beginning to tentatively 
embrace aspects of ‘conversations for accountability’ through their apparent willingness to engage in 
forms of ‘committed listening’ to fieldworkers during performance evaluation processes. While 
fieldworkers reflected positively on this development, these interactions remained a long way from 
fulfilling the idealized ‘conversations for accountability’ they aspired to. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the funding of NGDO 
activities and the corresponding upward accountability processes that this entails, especially with 
respect to external performance assessment. Within this section we consider conceptually how the 
academic literature has analysed the possible responses made to upward accountability processes as 
fieldworkers experience these processes. Second, we outline the research method and provide the 
contextual background for the study. Third, we present the case analysis. The final section summarizes 




UPWARD ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESSES AND NGDO PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 
NGDOs and their relationships with funders 
NGDOs typically receive aid funding from different sources and use this to provide welfare 
and other aid services to impoverished communities in developing countries. Funders2 include donor 
agencies such as global and private foundations that often provide grants for which NGDOs have to 
apply. Funding also derives from bilateral and multilateral agencies where two or more countries 
finance development aid activities together. A typical example of a bilateral agency funding NGDO is 
the Danish International Development Cooperation (DANIDA) which spent 15 billion Danish Krone 
(US$2.98 billion) on development assistance in 2011 (DANIDA website, accessed 10 November 
2014)3. Often, local community based NGDOs receive this funding once it has been channelled 
through large International NGOs (INGOs). These INGOs commonly have intermediate-level country 
offices and managers in developing countries to distribute the aid funding to grassroots NGDOs (some 
of which will be part of an INGO, some of which will be independent from an INGO). The key 
individuals involved in deploying and assessing the use of this funding at the community/grassroots 
level are NGDO fieldworkers, the focus of this study. 
Given the large sums of money allocated to development aid, there is significant interest 
among funders in assessing the extent to which this aid has been efficiently and effectively deployed, 
especially as funders are also accountable to their donors and taxpayers. There is ongoing evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the use of development funding in order to be accountable to stakeholders and 
NGDO accountability reporting for the use of aid resources forms an important part of this evaluation 
of use of resources by funders. This reporting, through which NGDO recipients of funding report back 
to funders about their use of funds represents an upward accountability process (Ebrahim, 2002, 2003, 
2005; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). As the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) states in its evaluation manual: 
In general terms, what an evaluation for accountability seeks to find out is whether the 
organizations that are responsible for the evaluated intervention have done as good a job as 
possible under the circumstances. This means trying to find out if, and to what extent, the 
intervention has achieved the results that it was intended to achieve or that it could reasonably 
have been expected to achieve (Molund and Schill, 2007, p.14). 
One of the key purposes of upward accountability processes, from the perspective of funders, 
is to evaluate whether the aid interventions have achieved pre-specified targets. Upward accountability 
allows for the external oversight and control in order to rationalise performance (Najam, 1996; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Roberts, 1991). The emphasis on disclosure and oversight suggests that 
upward accountability systems are often described as coercive or punitive (Ebrahim, 2009; Ebrahim, 
2005; Ebrahim and Rangan, 2010; Ferguson et al., 2010; Hall, 2014; Najam, 1996; Rahaman et al., 
2010). An overt focus on control and justification discourages the sharing of key contextual 
information regarding factors that might enable more informed assessments of the long term 
effectiveness of the nature and focus of aid delivery. Information which could lead to a potential re-
orientation of funders’ focus and objectives is not shared (Ebrahim, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2010).  
 Funders, however, also seek to learn about the contextual issues that impact on the 
achievement of targets (Hall, 2014).  For example, DANIDA (2006) explicitly states that a key goal of 
                                                             
2 Throughout the paper, we use the term “funder” to describe suppliers of funds to NGOs. We make no distinction between 
the terms ‘funders’ and ‘donors’. 
3 Another example is the UK Department for International Development (DFID) which, in 2013, spent £11.4 billion on 




monitoring and evaluation is for internal learning at all levels, programme level, and project level, 
organisational level and country level (DANIDA, 2006, page 12). This suggests the need for an 
upward accountability process that will encourage local NGDOs to develop and share solutions to 
problems and improvements (Free, 2007, p. 923). Fieldworker suggestions for improvements to 
indicators, work processes, and the focus of their work are valued by funders as part of a two-way 
dialogue aimed at continually improving the impact of development interventions and the ability of the 
system to support these improvements. Ebrahim (2009) refers to such accountability systems as 
adaptive accountability systems. An example of this is the UK Department for International 
Development DFID explaining what evaluation involves: using evaluation to discover what is working 
in development and what is not; identifying better ways of doing things; allowing for corrections to 
programmes to improve effectiveness; and ensuring that lessons are learned (DFID, 2005). More 
recently, several funders, particularly large bilateral development agencies such as DANIDA, DFID 
and SIDA have started to implement such upward accountability processes that are primarily 
underpinned by this learning evaluation logic (see, Hall, 2014). 
Prior work suggests that fieldworkers are likely to react positively to formal upward 
accountability requirements if they feel they enable them to perform their work better (Elbers and 
Arts, 2011; Ebrahim, 2002). Negative perceptions are deemed likely when the systems are perceived 
as an attempt by funders to control their effort (see, Jordan and Messner, 2012, p. 546; Jorgensen and 
Messner, 2009; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). Research has shown that accountability has an external 
control dimension as well as an internal response dimension (Ebrahim, 2003; Ebrahim, 2009; Fry, 
1995; Kearns, 1994; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015; Najam, 1996). The external control dimension 
reflects the organisation (i.e. the local NGDO) being “held responsible for actions” by funders, whilst 
the internal dimension relies on the accountees “taking responsibility” for their actions. How upward 
accountability processes impact upon the work of NGDO fieldworkers is important because of  the 
need to ensure that the holding to account, i.e. the control elements, are undertaken in a manner  that 
does not jeopardise fieldworkers taking responsibility for performance. In this paper we seek to gain a 
better understanding of fieldworkers’ experiences of upward accountability in their relationship with 
funders.  In particular we concentrate on ways in which they take responsibility, working within the 
external controls associated with upward accountability processes.   
NGDO Accountability: External Controls and Internal Responses   
Whilst the broad notion of external accountability has been widely studied, there is less work 
that analyses the internal organisational responses to external accountability pressures.  Several studies 
explain the multiple and diverse ways in which accountability is construed and understood by 
managers and officers (Fry, 1995; Kearns, 1994; Mulgan, 2000; Roberts, 1991; Sinclair, 1995). For 
example, Sinclair (1995) considers how Chief Executive Officers in the Australian public sector 
established their accountability to themselves and others. She drew on the multiple ways in which the 
concept is defined and understood in order to demonstrate the structures (or forms) of accountability 
(i.e. the controls, audits) and the personal discourses of fear, anxiety and vulnerability associated with 
accountability.  
Kearns (1994) offers a two-by-two matrix framework for analysing the accountability of non-
profit organizations that considers the external control dimensions of accountability and the possible 
internal responses to these dimensions.  The external controls associated with accountability include 
the explicit or implicit generation of performance standards by principals. The responses to these 
controls by agents may be tactical or strategic. Kearns identifies four possible responses to implicit 
and explicit controls within accountability processes. Compliance accountability represents a reactive, 
tactical response to external controls involving completely adhering to the imposition of explicit 
standards of performance by an outside agency. Negotiated accountability arises when accountability 
standards are implicit and emerge from shifting societal expectations thereby allowing for some 
reactive, tactical actions by agents through negotiation with principals regarding the standards to 
which they will be held to account. Professional/discretionary accountability embodies a proactive, 
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strategic internal response to external controls. This form of accountability involves agents responding 
in a discretionary manner to both perceived societal expectations and professional norms, irrespective 
of immediate threats or sanctions from the external environment.  Kearns (1994) contends that this 
form of accountability encompasses the ‘ethical action’ of “doing the right thing even when the right 
thing is technically unenforceable” (p. 189). Finally, anticipatory/positioning accountability involves 
agents seeking to anticipate the formulation of new standards in order to position themselves for 
compliance or even seeking to play a part in constructing the standards they consider are likely to be 
enacted. 
 Compliance accountability is associated with imposed accountability regimes (Ebrahim, 
2003; 2009; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Najam, 1996; O'Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). NGDO upward 
accountability demands may lead to compliance where NGDO fieldworkers consider the processes to 
be mandatory, perhaps because they contain explicit performance standards aimed at external control. 
On the other hand, where the performance standards contained within upward accountability 
requirements are implicit and imprecise, there may be opportunities for a negotiated accountability 
response whereby NGOs engage in dialogue with funders over the nature of the performance standards 
they must comply with. More strategic responses arise when NGOs, or in our case individual 
fieldworkers, have internalised professional standards and some notion of “doing the right thing” even 
where there is no pressure from the external (funding) environment. Professional/discretionary 
accountability may even arouse anticipatory/positioning accountability as NGOs seek to “play a 
meaningful proactive role in shaping and defining the standards they believe will eventually be 
imposed” (Kearns, 1994, p. 180; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015).  
Kearns (1994) provides an analytical frame for considering the reactive and strategic 
responses non-profit organisations may make in response to governmental demands in the context of a 
developed economy such as the United States. Kearns’ (1994) discussions primarily concentrate on the 
external/societal control of non-profit organisations. While Kearns (1994) addresses controls and 
accountability from an organisational point of view, in his discussion he refers to what managers do in 
response to external controls. We recognise that our empirical context is different and thus not all the 
elements of Kearns’ (1994) framework necessarily apply. For example, given the roles of the 
fieldworkers, they may be restricted in undertaking aspects of the strategic moves suggested by Kearns 
(1994). Despite this, however, key aspects of the framework enable us to examine both the internal 
responses and the external controls associated with NGDO accountability in the context we examine.  
We also recognise that the accountability processes examined in this paper occur in a 
developing country context with fieldworkers responding to upward accountability processes derived 
from external funders based in developed economies. Local NGDOs and their external funders exist 
and operate within a power imbalance context and the upward accountability reporting practices can 
“entrench the[se] power relations” (Dar, 2014, p. 135; Najam, 1996; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; 
O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2006) making negotiation between local NGDOs and their funders 
problematic. Complying with upward accountability requirements is also often seen by NGDOs as 
necessary for developing trust with their funders and is often taken to be the key response to upward 
accountability requirements (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). Our mobilization of Kearns’ (1994) 
conceptual insights enables us to conduct a more nuanced analysis of the range of possible responses. 
Conversations for accountability 
Fry (1995) shifts the emphasis of accountability as an external form of control to consideration 
of how individuals working in organisations themselves may behave because of an intrinsic concern to 
be accountable. Employee actions are deemed to derive from a deep acceptance of responsibility, or a 
‘felt responsibility’ which is intrinsic and subjective and possesses an ethical or value-based 
dimension (O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015). This contrasts with accountability that is objective, 
external and public and represents a form of accountability that employees/agents “experience ... as 
meaningful, collaborative and effective” (Fry, 1995, p.183). To encourage ‘effective’ performance, 
Fry (1995) argues that accountability and felt responsibility need to be aligned. Fry (1995, p. 187) 
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contends that from the agents’ perspectives there are three issues that shape how accountability is 
experienced and which influence the extent to which external accountability requirements and felt 
responsibilities may be aligned: having a voice (being able to influence expectations and standards), 
congruence of intent (the extent to which the agent sees the requests of the principal as being in the 
principal’s self-interest or as meeting the needs of the greater good); and the history of exchange (the 
fairness and dignity within the overall accountability process). Fieldworkers, for example, may be 
provided with a wide range of contextual information from funders designed to enable them to 
understand how their work fits into the bigger picture of a funder’s overall objectives. This would then 
help align how they feel about their responsibilities within accountability processes because they 
develop a better understanding of their roles and of how things fit together.  
Fry (1995) suggests that this alignment between external accountability and felt responsibility 
is more likely where the overall accountability process is constructed as a form of conversation 
involving ‘committed listening’ to fieldworkers by funders and NGOs: 
Committed listening means listening to the other complain, whine, make excuses, worry, 
express doubt and distress without blame, judgement or reproach. (Fry, 1995, p. 189) 
In the context we study, this involves funders opening up accountability processes by 
developing alliances and collaborations with NGO fieldworkers that allow for the co-construction of 
measures and reports that are mutually agreed and aligned, as much as possible, with fieldworkers’ 
sense of felt responsibility (Fry, 1995, p.193). These idealised ‘conversations for accountability’ (Fry, 
1995, pp. 189-191) seek to create an “alliance around accountability” (Fry, 1995, p. 193) (embracing 
both anticipatory/positioning and negotiated accountability) that is structured around clarification and 
articulation of: 1) a request (from funders) or offer (by fieldworkers) to perform some services; 2) a 
public promise or commitment by fieldworkers to perform to a mutually agreed standard; 3) required 
interactions to complete the promised work; and 4) recognition and acceptance that the promise has 
been satisfactorily fulfilled arising from discussions (between beneficiaries, fieldworkers and funders). 
Fry (1995) claims that through these ‘conversations for accountability’ both principals and agents 
(funders, NGDOs and their fieldworkers) become more active and energised.  
O'Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) develop Fry’s felt responsibility notion by conceptualising 
‘felt accountability’ as a voluntary response to missions that are motivated by the ethical values of 
individuals working within an organisation. They argue that with felt accountability there is less 
concern about how funders or principals impose accountability but rather with how accountability can 
be used to develop a shared vision within an organisation; a perspective aligned with Kearns’ (1994) 
notion of professional/discretionary accountability. Employees/agents feel an intrinsic responsibility to 
answer to their own values, mission and culture. O'Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) suggest that felt 
accountability prospers when a ‘conversation for accountability’ process occurs, in which: there is less 
pressure to meet external accountability demands; employees are given a voice to contribute towards 
developing mutually agreed expectations, and evaluations occur in informal ways and through 
dialogue. 
In sum, there are many accountability forms that NGDO fieldworkers may experience in their 
relationships with NGDOs and funders. They may embrace outright reactive compliance with external 
funder demands or engage in efforts, when permitted, to co-construct accountability requirements in 
collaboration with funders. In certain circumstances, the resulting requirements may align, to some 
degree, with the fieldworkers’ felt responsibilities. A ‘conversations for accountability’ process 
involving committed listening by funders is offered as an idealised process through which 
fieldworkers might best realise this alignment. We mobilise the conceptual notions introduced above 





RESEARCH METHOD  
The Ghanaian Context 
This study specifically examines fieldworkers’ experiences of upward accountability processes 
in the Northern Ghana context. Ghana is located on the west coast of Africa, English is its official 
language, and its population was estimated at 24.2 million in 2010 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). 
In 2010, Ghana received Overseas Development Assistance of almost US $1.8 billion from 
development partners - including Canada, USA, United Kingdom, Denmark and the International 
Development Association (IDA). There is intense NGO activity in Northern Ghana, especially in and 
around the capital city of the region, Tamale, which has been labelled ‘the NGO capital of Ghana’ 
given the large number of international NGOs operating from there (Porter, 2003; Townsend et al., 
2004). NGO activity focuses on assorted areas including health, education and agriculture and poverty 
reduction programmes using micro credit schemes are prevalent. While poverty levels have fallen 
considerably in the past decade, about 30 per cent of Ghanaians live on less than $US1.25 a day. The 
Northern region, with a population of almost 2.3 million, is the most impoverished.  For example, key 
development indicators, such as child under-nutrition and adult literacy rates are lowest in this region, 
indicating a significant degree of underdevelopment and poverty (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). 
The Northern region provided an ideal field study site to examine issues of NGDO accountability 
given the range of development issues requiring attention and the clustering of a large number of 
diverse INGOs and local NGDOs in the area. Furthermore, competition for donor funding in the 
Northern region is intense, thereby providing an opportunity to examine in detail NGDO fieldworkers’ 
experiences of upward accountability in a context where donor power appears prevalent. 
The research process 
As the research objectives for this study focused on understanding NGDO fieldworkers’ 
experiences of upward accountability processes, an interpretive, qualitative research approach was 
adopted as this emphasises the description and an understanding of the meanings individuals assign to 
processes (Cooper and Morgan, 2008; Doz, 2011; Prasad and Prasad, 2002). The empirical data was 
collected and initially analysed throughout 2007 and 2008.  
We conducted in-depth, semi-structured individual and group interviews with thirty 
community-based NGDO fieldworkers4. We specifically focused on interviewing fieldworkers in 
NGDOs addressing health, education, agriculture and general poverty reduction as these are widely 
deemed to be the most pressing areas in need of development in Northern Ghana. A letter was sent to 
the executive directors of 31 NGDOs operating in these development areas in the Tamale region 
inviting them to participate in the study. Eleven NGDOs responded positively. The sample selection 
was purposive in that the focus of the study was on NGDOs that worked directly with beneficiaries 
(Patton, 2002). Consequently, interview material from one NGDO that did not work directly with 
beneficiaries but rather acted as an umbrella NGDO allocating funding was excluded from our 
analysis. Overall, the analysis in the paper is derived from thirty fieldworkers in eleven NGDOs (see 
Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
The participant NGDOs had differing structural characteristics. Some were local branches of 
INGOs, some were local partners working for and with the local branches of an INGO, and some were 
                                                             
4  Fieldworkers may not be aware of all the interactions that take place between more senior managers and funders as part of 
the accountability processes and dialogues.  The views expressed by them in this respect need to be understood in this light. 
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small independent local NGDOs. Despite these differences, all the NGDOs in the sample received 
their core funding from either international bilateral agencies or other international non-governmental 
sources. Bilateral agency funders of the NGDOs referred to by participants included USAID (United 
States Agency for International Development), DANIDA (the Danish government’s international 
development aid agency), DFID (the United Kingdom government’s Department for International 
Development), SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), and Irish Aid (the 
Irish foreign aid development agency). Non-governmental funders included Oxfam UK, Oxfam Novib 
(The Netherlands) and UNICEF (The United Nations Children’s Fund). Funding for services was 
generally received by the managers of the NGOs and disbursed to the fieldworkers for their work 
activities at the grassroots level where we conducted our interviews.  
Semi structured, in-depth face-to-face interviews were chosen as the core research method as 
they offer an effective way of gaining deep meaning and understanding from individuals working in 
the field (Patton, 2002). All except one of the thirty fieldworkers interviewed were Ghanaian nationals 
(the exception was a Canadian national). Almost half of the fieldworkers had been educated to at least 
undergraduate level in Ghanaian universities in areas such as agriculture, development studies and 
engineering. Two had been educated to graduate level in Denmark and the USA. The remainder had 
completed their senior high school (‘senior secondary school’) education. We found the fieldworkers 
to be both articulate and highly analytical. Some have suggested that in Northern Ghana, because 
fieldworkers are “often urban educated elites” this may impact on their relationships with beneficiaries 
as well as their views of funders and their requirements (Porter, 2003). In our interviews, however, we 
found them to be critical, and yet also sociable and hospitable.  Furthermore, as we unveil later in our 
case narrative, they also showed a deep interest in the welfare of beneficiaries. In eight of the eleven 
NGDOs the fieldworkers attended the interviews in groups (comprising 3 or 4 fieldworkers) and these 
engagements therefore took the form of group interviews (Agyemang et al., 2009a; Kitzinger 2004; 
Morgan et al, 1998)5.  
The interviews were conducted through the English language in the NGDO offices6 in the 
field by two of the authors, both of whom are Ghanaian nationals. They were assisted by a male 
Ghanaian postgraduate student who took detailed notes. Extensive efforts were made to create a non-
threatening, open atmosphere throughout the interviews. For example, the fieldworkers were reassured 
of the interviewees’ independence, guaranteed anonymity, and reminded that they would have an 
opportunity to discuss the preliminary findings of the study in a subsequent workshop. They reflected 
carefully on the questioning and probing and appeared sincere and comfortable when speaking of their 
individual experiences. They seemed anxious to assist with the project and carefully led both 
interviewers through a large range of documentary evidence both during and after the formal 
interviews. This evidence included all of the accountability reports the fieldworkers regularly 
completed for funders as well as case studies outlining their key interventions7. Extensive probing of 
fieldworker perspectives occurred throughout the interviews8. The interviews lasted from 45 to 90 
                                                             
5 Although, it is sometimes argued that group interviews may not offer the same level of trustworthiness as individual 
interviews, we contend that they proved to be highly beneficial in that the interactions between interviewees facilitates an 
enhanced understanding of experiences given that group members supplement, clarify, explain and share examples in 
interactive ways (Cameron, 2000; Kruger, 1994, 1998; Morgan, 1996). 
6 These were quite cramped, small buildings. One interview (NGDO B) was held outdoors in a shaded area around a table. 
7 All of this documentary evidence was photocopied and both interviewers received copies to take away with them for further 
analysis. 
8 Fieldworkers were also encouraged to debate among themselves when addressing our questions. For example, in one group 
interview (NGDO F) the fieldworkers initially disagreed on aspects of an issue being discussed but then debated it amongst 
themselves and eventually came to an agreement.  
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minutes and were audio-recorded with the advance permission of the fieldworkers and subsequently 
transcribed. Detailed notes were also taken during the interviews by both interviewers.  
The field notes and transcriptions were later analysed to ascertain common themes in relation 
to the fieldworkers’ experiences of the upward accountability processes and the performance 
assessment requirements therein. As the data from the fieldwork was collected, it was analysed 
inductively, firstly by the two interviewers and later by all four researchers. We continually sought out 
unexpected and contradictory evidence or opinions in the empirical data (Patton, 2002; Silverman, 
2010). A set of codes based on the main questions and sub-questions contained in the interview guide 
was developed (Huberman and Miles, 1994; Ryan and Bernard, 2003). These codes were subsequently 
re-analysed and eventually collapsed into the following broad themes: routine compliance; absence of 
critique; positive story reporting; fear of funding curtailment; selective reporting; working under 
constraints; and pressures and tensions of reporting.  
These themes formed the basis of the preliminary descriptive analysis of the findings. We 
subsequently presented this interim analysis at a feedback and clarification workshop all four authors 
held with 24 fieldworkers (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The workshop was organised to be highly 
participative. After an initial presentation of the preliminary findings of the study by one of the 
authors, the fieldworkers, in their groups, were invited to review and comment on these findings. A 
member of each group then presented their views to all participants of the workshop, which led to a 
lively forum and plenary discussion. Comments from this workshop were fed into the empirical 
analysis in order to refine aspects of the preliminary analysis.  
Subsequent analysis drew on the comments from the feedback workshop and focused more 
specifically on interpreting the main themes in the context of an initial theoretical framing which 
informed an earlier version of this paper. An on-going iterative process of listening to the interview 
data on the tape recordings, reading and re-reading the transcriptions and referring back to the core 
literature driving the study (latterly focused especially on Fry (1995) and Kearns (1994)), an 
understanding of the how the fieldworkers experienced the upward accountability processes emerged 
(Locke, 1996). Whilst the research study did not aim to understand accountability processes from the 
perspective of the funders, in analysing our data for this paper we were interested in reflecting on the 
views expressed by the fieldworkers about their funding relationships. However, in order to gain a 
better understanding of the expectations of funders with respect to the upward accountability 
processes, we selected two key funders who were consistently referred to by our fieldworkers - 
DANIDA and DFID - and undertook a detailed analysis of their monitoring and evaluation processes, 
drawing on key documents from their websites. This helped inform our overall analysis of the 
fieldworkers’ experiences of upward accountability. Continual redrafting, reanalysis and interaction 
between the data and core informing literature was undertaken to craft the case analysis presented in 
the next section.  
 
EXPERIENCING UPWARD ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESSES 
This section presents the case narrative. Firstly, it identifies the different types of upward 
accountability processes that fieldworkers experienced. It then provides an analysis of their 
perceptions of these processes and, in particular, their efforts at managing upward accountability 





Types of upward accountability processes  
Two main types of performance reports were produced by the NGDO fieldworkers as part of 
their upward accountability processes: disclosure reports and performance evaluation (and assessment) 
reports. According to the fieldworkers the main audiences for these reports were overseas funders (see 
Table 2). The fieldworkers were required to provide these reports to evidence how much funding they 
received, how it had been used, what benefits derived from its use, and what lessons could be learned 
from the work they completed.  
There were two types of disclosure reports – annual and interim reports. Each year all NGDOs 
produced an annual summary report of their activities showing operational and financial performance. 
Interim reports were commonly required every quarter and included details of funds received and 
indicators of their utilisation. Both the interim and annual reports focused firstly on quantitative 
performance indicators such as: the number of clients visited (micro credit NGDOs (designated 
NGDO A and NGDO K (see Table 1)); the number of beneficiaries receiving capacity building 
training (micro credit, agriculture and water and sanitation NGDOs (A, B, J, K and E); the number of 
patients visited (health NGDOs (C and H)); the number of health outreach meetings held (health 
NGDOs (C and H)); the number of women paying credit back on time (micro credit NGDOs (A and 
K)); and student attendance, enrolment and progression figures (education NGDOs (F and G)). Both 
types of disclosure report allowed significant scope for reporting a narrative summary of achievements 
and explicitly encouraged discussions of problem areas where activity targets had not been met as well 
as the “lessons fieldworkers had learned” from undertaking the activities (see Table 3). For example, 
fieldworkers in NGDO F included the following narrative summary of achievements in one of their 
interim reports: 
Every six months health and nutrition assessments are conducted on 8,400 enrolled children. 
1,420 children are given one meal a day when in school … 673 parents and children were 
introduced to Early Childhood Development to properly give their children a good foundation 
for their physical and mental development. 
Many of the lessons fieldworkers had learned were reported as operational issues they had 
encountered.  For example, an NGDO working in the health sector with mentally ill patients (NGDO 
C) reported the following: 
Our work has equally shown that to be able to engage in work is a form of therapy that 
quickens and deepens the stabilisation of the mentally ill and this has been demonstrated in the 
horticultural project ... Our work has equally shown that having become stabilised they and 
their carers need some support to start life afresh … Our work with our partners has also 
shown that people and organizations are willing to support the mentally ill … The huge 
demand created from our consultation, education and awareness-raising activities has 
outstripped the resources available. As a result of this there is pressure on [name of NGDO C] 
to meet the enthusiasm that stabilised people have in wanting to do something for themselves. 
(NGDO C Project report to Funder) 
Performance evaluation (and assessment) reports were required at specific stages during the 
life of individual projects. Performance evaluation reports were typically written at the end of a 
project or at the end of a funding stream, and represented final summative reports to funders (see 
Table 4). Performance assessment reports were written on an on-going basis and were much more 
comprehensive than annual or interim disclosure reports. These reports concentrated on the extent to 
which predefined project aims and objectives were being achieved. Both reporting types explicitly 
encouraged explanations of the context in which projects were undertaken together with reasons why 
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projects were proving successful or otherwise. Significant attention was afforded to encouraging the 
reporting of issues surrounding project or aid sustainability and the extent to which any ‘learning’ had 
emerged from undertaking the projects. This was consistent with an apparent overall aim among 
several funders of obtaining evidence of broader, longer-term impacts of projects. It was made clear in 
all of these reporting requirements that contextualisation of indicators was important to funders’ 
assessments in order to enable them to learn from the fieldworkers’ experiences. The scope provided 
for this form of reporting represented an explicit invitation to fieldworkers to think and report more 
broadly about the work they were undertaking in order to contribute more widely to improving the 
effectiveness of development interventions. This desire to embed a ‘learning evaluation’ logic 
(Ebrahim, 2009; Hall, 2014) within upward accountability processes was also evident in much of the 
funder documentation we studied. Documents from DFID for example suggested that they were 
deeply interested in the lessons to be learned from projects and programmes: 
The lessons learning process involves openly documenting and disseminating experience for 
all development partners, so that this information can be transformed into knowledge over 
time, and then inform the design of future activities. In order to improve the collective 
performance of the international development community, lessons learned may inform future 
strategic planning and performance management internally, or inter-organizational planning. 
In the short-term, lessons learned may help development partners to make specific decisions, 
such as whether to extend a project, or how to amend a particular policy that may be inhibiting 
the sustainability of the activity (DFID, 2005, p.11). 
Nevertheless, despite this distinct impression given by funders suggesting that a learning logic 
underpinned their upward accountability processes, the perceptions of fieldworkers, drawing on their 
extensive experience in the field, indicated that in practice these processes were more often seen to be 
overtly controlling. We explore these perceptions in the following sub-section. 
Perceptions of being “held to account”: tactical compliance 
The majority of fieldworkers were concerned with what they considered restrictions imposed 
on their work by the requirements of funder performance reports. They were especially concerned 
about a focus on short term, highly specific activities and outputs which were frequently imposed in a 
top-down manner. While many acknowledged the aforementioned flexibility offered in reports 
through the provision of scope for contextualising reported indicators, in practice they felt that funders 
focused exclusively on the quantitative performance indicator requirements. In effect, to them, funders 
were merely concerned with external control (Kearns, 1994) and their key response was to comply. As 
one fieldworker working in child sponsorship noted, precise reporting against indicators was essential 
if funding streams were to be maintained and beneficiaries’ needs protected: 
If you don’t meet the [funder’s] exact request in your reporting, they will get fed up and they 
will cancel their funding and drop the children … The child and the community will lose. So, 
we must always make sure we meet the [funder’s] request. (NGDO D – child sponsorship)  
Fry (1995) suggests that the extent to which accountability operates to monitor or enable work 
depends on how principals (in this case, the funders) value the work being undertaken. Many 
fieldworkers complained that the reporting requirements often failed to appreciate the on-the-ground 
realities they faced daily. Complying with the requirements of upward accountability, while necessary, 
was frustrating for them as the accountability requirements did not show that funders had a clear  
understanding of the developmental work they were undertaking. Several fieldworkers spoke of the 
slow nature of the development process and of how deficient beneficiary capabilities triggered drawn-
out decision-making processes “that [they] could not easily change”. This ‘reality’ contrasted with the 
“quick fixes” (NGDO B - agriculture) that, in their view, were frequently required by funders. 
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Working with slow-moving local community processes while having to report within very strict 
timescales was especially frustrating: 
Now the funds usually come and you have a certain time within which you need to give 
reports on output. Yes, we have been given the funds and in six months’ time we expect some 
results. [Regardless] of the fact that you work with institutions that you don’t [have] control 
over, there may be decision-making processes that you cannot easily change – you have to 
work within them … By the time you work with the community and ensure that the decisions 
are taken for you to be able to move, maybe by that time the community would have lost out 
and they cannot access the particular funds. So what do we do? … So, sometimes when donor 
funds come with stringent conditions, it is the ultimate beneficiary that suffers. (NGDO C – 
mental health) 
Several fieldworkers contended that ways of dealing with particular development problems 
were largely predetermined within reporting requirements that were inherently inflexible. For 
example, the water and sanitation NGDO (E) was required to use specific technologies as its funders 
thought they were relatively cheap. The fieldworkers maintained that these technologies, such as hand-
pumping equipment, were often unsuitable as local ground conditions led to wells drying up after a 
short period. Despite this, performance reports required data on the use of the specified technologies 
only.  In order to comply, fieldworkers continued to utilise the technologies even where they were 
convinced that they were inefficient and ineffective. Such compliance also had further negative effects 
with fieldworkers  refraining from reporting the failings associated with the technologies as they felt it 
detracted from their ability to report ‘good performance’ as defined by required output indicators - 
such as the number of hand-dug wells or bore holes. During interviews the fieldworkers exhibited 
considerable astuteness, and explained that these technologies wasted the funders’ resources given that 
a more effective long-term achievement of their overall water relief aims could be achieved by funding 
a smaller number of more expensive water delivery systems: 
For example, if the solution to the water problem in the community is … a small community 
pipe system, but the donor says I want to see X number of boreholes or X number of hand-dug 
wells, definitely such a community will lose out on that. (NGDO E – water and sanitation)  
In a bid to be seen to be compliant, they did not share these perceptions with the funders. 
Compliance, as suggested by Kearns (1994), was used as a tactical response to the accountability 
demands. Additionally, in order to be seen to be compliant the fieldworkers revealed how they took 
actions to prioritise the outputs and processes required by funders. For example, while it was 
important to give local communities some sense of involvement in identifying needs, fieldworkers felt 
constrained by their funder reporting requirements and frequently steered communities’ perceptions of 
their needs towards their funder’s preferred focus: 
We go on the radio … We do a lot of “sensitisation” - creating awareness for the people - … 
[We hold] community sessions … We try to help them to come out with their needs [but, 
ultimately] we identify their needs and prioritise their needs. (NGDO B - agriculture) 
 
 The purpose of the sensitisation referred to above was to ensure that the key problems 
identified by funders were actually prioritised. This would allow fieldworkers to provide reports 
demonstrating compliance even though it made their work more cumbersome.Kearns (1994) identifies 
compliance as a tactical internal response made to accountability demands that operate as external 
control systems and our analysis suggests that fieldworkers were continually anxious to exhibit 
compliance. Clearly, there were power asymmetries between the funders and NGDOs that meant there 
were conditions placed on project design and planning and funding arrangements within the 
accountability processes which compelled fieldworkers to find ways to comply with the requirements 
(Dar, 2014; Ebrahim, 2009; Edwards and Hulme, 1997; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2006). Underpinning 
these perceptions was a sense that the fieldworkers did not feel that funders entirely trusted them (or 
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the local NGO). They suggested that too often they were offered a limited voice to shape expectations 
and standards even where they felt alternative approaches were more appropriate and effective. There 
was little sense of an alliance around accountability facilitating a conversation involving ‘committed 
listening’ by funders (Fry, 1995). Negotiated accountability was, therefore, in many cases, simply not 
feasible. Despite this, while prior work suggests that NGO fieldworkers frequently respond to 
perceived funder controlling efforts by strategizing in negative and manipulative ways (see Elbers and 
Arts, 2011), our ensuing analysis reveals how the fieldworkers worked within, and around, these 
perceived constraints in a positive, constructive manner. In doing so, they sought to ensure that the 
upward accountability requirements could be mobilized to allow them to fulfil, as much as possible, 
their widespread sense of felt responsibility to beneficiaries. It is to this seemingly contradictory 
response that we now turn.  
Felt responsibility and accountability in action 
Sinclair (1995) argues that discourses of accountability often illustrate the multiple layers of 
meaning, contradictions and tensions associated with the concept. We observed these layers, in 
particular the contradictions, among the fieldworkers. Notwithstanding the widespread perception of 
inflexibility accorded to many of the performance reporting requirements and the underlying activities 
they encouraged, the fieldworkers articulated situations where requirements to report on certain 
indicators actually assisted them in improving their work by steering behaviour and action in what 
they saw as sensible directions. The upward accountability processes which were argued to be 
constraining, in terms of the actions they encouraged, were also sometimes seen as “perfectly 
sensible” (Sinclair, 1995, p. 228). For example, in the child literacy education NGDO (F) output 
measures requiring fieldworkers to focus on behavioural changes in children by examining enrolment 
rates, drop-out rates, attendance rates, and the rate of student progression to further education were 
widely praised. The process of gathering information for and writing the disclosure reports also made 
certain aspects of the fieldworkers’ work more visible forcing them to critically assess their operations 
and to direct resources in a more focused manner. 
 
The necessity of reporting and explaining variances within disclosure reports often uncovered 
previously unknown contextual reasons for deviations and “helped keep [fieldworkers] on their toes” 
(NGDO J - agriculture). This assisted them in understanding the logic underpinning the upward 
accountability processes they were required to comply with and, most importantly, enabled them to 
identify where alterations in their own approaches might be required: 
[One] report was monitoring [standardised] growth … [the variances reported meant] that I 
went to look at how … the farmers [used] some of the tools they were [provided with] [and] 
… whether they were using the tools properly. If they were not, I made some corrections … 
After that, I wrote [in the report] whether they actually used the tools to work at all. Did they 
go to the bush [the farm] at all … and did they need and use the input? (NGDO I – poverty 
reduction) 
Despite receiving limited information regarding the rationales underlying many of the 
performance indicators, the requirement to focus on certain indicators meant that some fieldworkers 
established their own rationales in situations where indicators made sense to them in their daily work. 
It was clear that the ‘world of action’ took priority over indicators, with indicators representing a 
necessary point of orientation as opposed to an ultimate point of truth (Jordan and Messner, 2012). It 
is within this “world of action” that the fieldworkers could act and respond to situations on the ground.  
Even where they found indicators inappropriate, inflexible or incomplete, they rarely appeared 
demotivated and their commitment to contributing to enhancing the effectiveness of their interventions 
remained resolute. Hence, the standards and expectations were absorbed and internalised as the 
fieldworkers ‘felt’ responsible for their actions (Fry, 1995).  Moreover, irrespective of the exact 
indicators they had to adopt or the specific work focus of the funding requirements, they appeared 
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intrinsically motivated to make improvements to their work on-the-ground. Responsibility for actions 
(for example, the fieldworker quoted above states: “I made the corrections”) and accountability 
became entangled (for example, the fieldworker quoted above also states “I wrote the report”). Feeling 
responsible was coupled with feeling accountable despite the perception of control within the upward 
accountability processes. 
Proactive and strategic responses 
O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) suggest that felt accountability prospers where NGOs face less 
external accountability pressures and that this offers the flexibility to develop accountability processes 
that suit agreed internal needs. Our fieldworkers’ efforts, however, often involved working around 
external accountability requirements. Their overriding sense of felt responsibility motivated this 
approach rather than any flexibility offered in the upward accountability processes. For example, 
fieldworkers in the mental health, education and agriculture NGDOs frequently referred to the 
importance of beneficiary “capacities”; a term used to refer to perceived levels of literacy and 
understanding among beneficiaries. These were, according to fieldworkers, possibly not considered 
when performance indicators were designed externally, but through working closely with these 
beneficiaries fieldworkers developed detailed knowledge of specific needs which they attempted to 
adapt to the reporting requirements. In effect, the fieldworkers used their professional knowledge and 
employed their discretion in interpreting the requirements of funders. Kearns (1994) refers to 
professional and discretionary accountability as the situation where people take responsibility for 
interpreting standards of performance and are proactive in doing so. By considering the needs of the 
beneficiaries the fieldworkers were evidently seeking to “do [what they saw as] the right thing” 
(Kearns, 1994, p. 189). In one instance, the child literacy education NGDO (F) discovered that the 
education process required much longer periods of training for literacy class facilitators than the 
funder reporting timelines allowed. The fieldworkers sought to solve this problem by extending the 
pre-training period for facilitators to ensure that they had a greater impact within the funder training 
timeline period: 
We used to build capacities by training facilitators between January and March. Classes start 
in May/June. But the facilitators made it known to us that they would work better if they had a 
longer period of training. So, this year we have moved the training start date to November … 
They can now have 7 to 8 months to build up their expertise before the classes start (NGDO F 
– child literacy education). 
To further demonstrate this sense of felt responsibility, other fieldworkers alluded to 
constantly scrutinising their on-the-ground work and gathering and storing key information to help 
improve beneficiary lives. In situations where the focus of funder requirements was considered to be 
misguided, opportunities for improvement were identified. The information was used to guide 
NGDOs’ internal assessments of operational areas that required their attention irrespective of funder 
reporting demands, thereby allowing them to improve their overall work processes’ and the perceived 
effectiveness with which aid was utilised: 
We try to examine what has been the state of [our] work with regards to community mental 
health. How many health outreaches have been held in a year? How many life stories have 
been written, how well have they been written? You know things like that, and this brings out 
issues that might need attention. Some of the information may or may not be required by 
funders but [we] need that [information] to implement our programme as well. So for us, it is 
like an internal programme audit [irrespective of funder requirements]. Knowledge sharing is 
very important to us internally and we have a centre where we upload all our reports even 
though they are just for internal use [they do not go to funders]… we see it like an obligation. 
(NGDO C – mental health) 
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Being able to account and justify the use of funding was, however, always considered most 
important and where internal feelings of responsibility meant taking decisions and opportunities that 
fell outside of the funding scope, they were almost never pursued. Fieldworkers were highly aware of 
the lack of flexibility in programme delivery and always sought to position themselves to comply even 
when they did not agree with the explicit performance requirements. For example, in the water and 
sanitation NGDO (E) fieldworkers were convinced that their primary funder’s preference for 
supporting rural development was a sub-optimal use of funding. They argued that the acute need for 
their services arose in urban areas like Tamale. However, they were required to undertake and report 
on the number of rural development activities only, which they did despite recognising that resources 
could have been used much more effectively in urban development activities:  
For instance, this year because of the heavy downpour – the rains -, we had problems because 
we were supposed to construct 658 household latrines. But because of the nature of the 
weather - that was around July, August and September – we could not do anything [in rural 
regions] … If we were going to excavate 658 latrines in [name of urban region] we would 
have finished it. (NGDO E – water and sanitation) 
The fieldworkers recognised that they did not have the power, “vis a vis”, funders to make 
strategic decisions to change or redefine programme activities (Kearns, 1994). Taking independent 
decisions could impact upon the level of trust the funders may place in them. Hence, whatever they 
felt about the inappropriateness of the external controls, they were always anxious to demonstrate the 
care with which they used and accounted for funding. It was important to them to demonstrate their 
commitment to transparency and compliance; a desire derived from a long-standing fear of being 
viewed as corrupt and fraudulent by foreign-based funders (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Mohan, 2002; 
Yarrow, 2008): 
Information sharing in the reports is very important to us … [It provides] the paper evidence 
of what is going on … It helps to build some trust and confidence between them [funders] and 
us [fieldworkers]. (NGDO C – mental health) 
Building trust is an important precursor to gaining influence and this was seen as important to 
attain before offering suggestions for change. While Kearns (1994) discusses anticipatory/positioning 
accountability as involving agents anticipating the formulation of new standards in order to position 
themselves for compliance, in our case, the fieldworkers were anticipating that compliance could lead 
to influence. 
Fieldworkers constantly had to manage their feelings of responsibility for actions against this 
perceived need for compliance. While they largely understood upward accountability in terms of 
external controls funders were, as we outlined earlier, also interested in receiving contextual 
information that impacted on programme effectiveness. Contextual reporting was explicitly 
encouraged by the scope provided for additional information in many of the required reports. 
However, fieldworkers often toned down the significance of this contextual information or failed to 
report it as they claimed they had little idea as to what impact it would have or how funders would use 
it. Several fieldworkers complained that when they reported against pre-determined indicators funders 
“never came back to ask for further [clarifying] information” (NGDO I – poverty reduction) or “d[id] 
not account to [them] [or] tell [them] what they use[d] the reports for” (NGDO H – support for 
disabled). Feedback about the use and impact of the performance reports represented an intrinsic 
reward acknowledging the importance of their efforts and they were therefore anxious to know how 
the reports were being used to evaluate their work, in particular the direct consequences any 
evaluations had for future funding: 
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The fact of the matter is that there is no mutual accountability from donor[s] ... They appear 
willing to listen but whether they apply what you tell them is another thing. To say it directly, 
our funder in [name of country] has never accounted … to [us]. (NGDO F – child literacy 
education) 
This perception of limited funder reciprocity meant there was a reluctance to report potentially 
crucial contextual information. This view may, however, have been misguided since it is possible that 
the local NGO managers were made aware by funders of how contextual information was used. The 
fieldworkers may not have known what was going on during the reporting negotiation between NGO 
managers and funders and therefore assumed that there was no reciprocity or “history of exchange” of 
information in a frank, fair and open manner (Fry, 1995). The issue remains however, that this 
widespread perception of upward accountability as primarily about control meant that creating shared 
visions and outcomes through aligning felt responsibility and an enabling upward accountability in 
‘conversations for accountability’ (Fry, 1995) remained elusive.  
Tentative steps towards ‘conversations for accountability’ 
Fry (1995) suggests embedding accountability in conversations to enable agents and principals 
to work together to develop shared visions and understandings of performance. These conversations 
for accountability embrace three conditions deemed essential to aiding the alignment of external 
accountability and felt accountability: agents having a voice; congruence of intent; and fairness and 
dignity in the process of exchange. More recently, funder efforts have evolved, albeit tentatively, 
towards developing such mutual explorations. A central feature of this perceived shift was the 
increased use of informal feedback processes and on-the-ground evaluations of fieldworkers´ work, all 
of which fieldworkers welcomed. Given the lack of formal feedback mechanisms, many fieldworkers 
emphasised how informal face-to-face channels were essential to addressing the problem of limited 
information exchange in the formal reporting as they offered greater potential for sharing crucial 
contextual information and receiving timely, focused feedback. They contended that these mechanisms 
were more effective in helping funders “appreciate the real issues preventing effective development 
interventions” (Fieldworker comment from the feedback workshop). Several fieldworkers called for 
funders’ representatives to visit them more often “so that they c[ould] see what [wa]s happening on the 
ground” (NGDO H – support for disabled) and thereby understand the NGDO operational context 
better. It was widely felt that these interactions could also provide fieldworkers with information on 
the actual as opposed to the perceived importance funders attached to contextual information reported 
alongside required indicators.  
Prior to our field work, certain funders had commenced interacting more informally with 
fieldworkers. In two cases, evaluations and reviews feeding into performance evaluation (and 
assessment) reports were carried out jointly by fieldworkers and funders’ representatives (NGDO G – 
Muslim education and NGDO H – support for disabled) thereby allowing fieldworkers a voice in 
evaluation. The funder of one of the agriculture NGDOs (NGDO B) introduced ‘organizational 
reviews’ using fieldworkers and funder representatives working together. While the fieldworkers 
acknowledged that these were not routine encounters and they were sometimes sceptical about the 
funders’ intent the face-to-face communication and relationship building encouraged them to more 
readily share contextual information that they had previously hoarded. As these informal processes 
involved “more [committed] listening and response from the [funders]” (NGDO B - agriculture) they 
dampened some, albeit far from all, of the aforementioned concerns about limited reciprocity by at 
least offering the potential to discuss the rationales behind indicators.  
Increasing fieldworker interactions with consultants operating on behalf of funders also 
emerged in the period immediately prior to our field work. For example, fieldworkers in the disability 
health NGDO (H) met with different NGDOs and consultants working for funders to discuss general 
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concerns, aided by interpreters. Within these face-to-face meetings, they said they felt freer to share 
information incorporating the contextual challenges they faced. They also received elaboration on the 
rationales behind some indicators they had queried. These channels were also sometimes used as a 
medium where different fieldworkers’ common concerns could be shared with funders, through the 
consultants. This allowed them to give voice to their felt responsibilities and seek out some 
‘congruence of intent’ (Fry, 1995, p. 187) between these responsibilities and the funders’ goals within 
the overall accountability process. However, ultimately there was no guarantee that their suggestions 
would initiate a substantive funder response: 
We [a group of fieldworkers] were all together with the consultants and we realised that most 
of our problems, our challenges were about the same and the changes we were suggesting 
were all about the same … The consultants indicated [that they were not] here to tell [us] that 
a change c[ould] be made. They would go back … and discuss it with the donors and bring 
back their comments … They also made it easier for us to communicate as they came with a 
bilingual interpreter. (NGDO H – support for disabled)  
In the few instances where funders actively provided feedback to fieldworkers, the 
fieldworkers claimed that they had reacted positively and shared additional information. This 
apparently helped build tentative levels of mutual trust that were inevitably tempered by the nature of 
their prior experiences with upward accountability. For instance, fieldworkers in the NGDO providing 
basic education literacy to Muslim children (NGDO G – Muslim education) indicated how their work 
had benefited from the introduction of funder feedback and discussion about their activities. This 
responsiveness encouraged them to share contextual information about the changing circumstances 
facing different families and how the focus of the funding should be realigned to address them (for 
example, by supporting initial educational ‘needs assessments’ of entire families). The funder 
subsequently disseminated the NGDO’s proposals among the education literacy NGDO community 
which led to widespread recognition of the impacts of the NGDO´s proposed approach and a change to 
the focus suggested by the NGDO. 
A fieldworker in the disability health NGDO (H) initially outlined major concerns regarding 
the historical lack of feedback his NGDO had received on detailed, contextualised case studies 
submitted as part of their reporting. However, he also praised his funders for eventually, albeit slowly, 
increasing their responsiveness as they had recently commenced providing feedback and offering more 
regular support in response to the key contextual challenges reported by his NGDO: 
You know, we are [now] finally corresponding regularly, and there may be certain area 
problems, management problems, financial, anything. So, they [funders] now give some 
support [to] resolve any challenges that we may have. (NGDO H – support for disabled)  
 Two funders had commenced more active monitoring in order to directly assess the 
effectiveness of NGDOs’ actions (NGDO A – micro credit and NGDO G – Muslim education). This 
involved funder representatives visiting local communities to try to ascertain from the communities 
and their observations the direct impact the funded NGDOs’ work was having. While this form of 
intervention could have been seen as threatening, the fieldworkers in both NGDOs welcomed it as it 
allowed them to engage substantively with funders regarding on-the-ground challenges they faced. 
This also offered them some possibility of aligning funder accountability demands better with their felt 
responsibilities: 
The [funder] now monitors a lot. They will even move down into the community without you, 
[NGDO A] to check that what you say you are doing in this place is actually happening. We 
[NGDO A] are happy with this. You want your funders to monitor. They have to come to the 
grassroots and see what we do instead of just sending letters … We want them to know that 
we are actually always with the people and we are doing what we believe we should be doing. 
(NGDO A – micro credit) 
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In summary, our case narrative unveils three key issues with respect to the fieldworkers’ 
experiences of NGDO upward accountability processes. First, fieldworkers’ experiences created the 
impression that the processes were primarily aimed at external control and instigating compliance 
accountability responses. Second, fieldworkers were frequently driven by an intrinsic desire to support 
beneficiaries whatever the perceived demands of the upward accountability processes. They were 
pragmatic with respect to their responses and exhibited a ‘felt responsibility’ to beneficiaries. In order 
to fulfil this responsibility they sought to skillfully work with and around the upward accountability 
requirements in order to enable a form of felt accountability in which professional/discretionary 
accountability motivated anticipatory/positioning accountability. Third, conversations for 
accountability were important to fieldworkers in both the development and enactment of upward 
accountability processes. The advent of increasing face-to-face interactions between funders and 
fieldworkers had begun to facilitate conversations aimed at ensuring that aid resources were used more 
effectively. While the fieldworkers reflected positively on these interactions, they were some way off 
the idealised ‘conversations for accountability’ conditions proposed by Fry (1995, pp. 189-191). In 
particular, the extent to which funders were beginning to engage in ‘committed listening’ was unclear 
given that much of the interaction was occurring after accountability metrics had been developed by 
funders (with apparently limited NGDO and fieldworker input).   
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presented the results of a field study conducted among thirty NGDO fieldworkers 
working and delivering development aid within impoverished communities in Northern Ghana. Our 
analysis focused on the experiences of the fieldworkers with respect to the upward accountability 
processes they used to communicate their performance to funders and the perceived impact these 
experiences had on their work with NGDO beneficiaries. The paper is one of the few studies to 
examine the potential of upward accountability processes using in-depth analyses of the actual 
experiences of those involved in delivering NGO services at the grassroots level (see, Awio et al., 
2011; Dixon et al., 2006) and contributes to emerging work in this vein by enriching our 
understanding of local constituencies’ experiences of accountability processes more generally, in 
particular the impact these mechanisms have on their operational activities. 
Our findings suggest that the upward accountability processes were perceived to be aimed at 
external control. Despite these perceptions, we did not uncover evidence of ‘recalcitrant effort’, nor 
did we find evidence of mere routine compliance among fieldworkers. A key feature of the case was 
the fieldworkers’ commitment to improving beneficiary lives. Our analysis uncovered an intrinsic 
sense of felt responsibility (Fry, 1995; O’Dwyer and Boomsma, 2015) to beneficiaries, informed by 
self-perceptions in which fieldworkers frequently viewed themselves as change agents. It was 
underpinned by a combination of a sense of pride, a perceived common culture, and professionalism 
which motivated fieldworkers to continually review and improve their work processes and work focus. 
Felt responsibility mediated for the control that was seen to underpin the upward accountability 
processes. Fieldworkers, consequently, accepted that they had to work with and around the upward 
accountability processes if their ambitions to assist beneficiaries were to be realised. Hence, 
irrespective of funders’ required work focus and choice of specific performance indicators, the 
fieldworkers continually mobilised their local knowledge in an effort to assist in improving 
beneficiary lives. Reporting against specific indicators represented merely one possible, albeit vital, 
means through which they felt this responsibility might be fulfilled.  
Kearns (1994) points to four possible internal responses to external controls, two of which he 
considers tactical (compliance and negotiated) and two strategic (professional/discretionary and 
anticipatory). Our findings suggest the fieldworkers engaged in elements of each of these responses, 
though there was less evidence of negotiated and  anticipatory responses. Compliance was important 
for trust building which would ensure ongoing financial support for projects. Professional and 
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discretionary responses were employed subtly and in ways that enabled fieldworkers to fulfil their felt 
responsibility. As fieldworkers, they were less powerful than the senior managers who interacted more 
with funders; hence, any strategic moves in response to upward accountability processes had to be 
undertaken very cautiously. 
Fieldworkers expressed few problems with being closely assessed per se and were positive 
about the idea of indicators, especially if they improved their effectiveness. While many fieldworkers 
advocated flexibility in upward accountability processes through the reporting of ‘stories’ which 
would enrich ‘abstract’ indicators, they were not intrinsically ‘anti-indicators’ and were open to 
discovering where indicators could facilitate their decision making. For them, the ideal of ‘proof’ 
underpinning the use of indicators and the ideal of ‘richness’ driving the mobilisation of stories were 
not incompatible (see, Hall, 2014). Hence, while they wanted to be able to flexibly respond to local 
circumstances, they did not see this as fundamentally incompatible with the parameters that funders 
might set. These findings resonate somewhat with Saj’s (2012) study of a community service 
organisation in Australia where onerous mandatory external reporting requirements were assessed 
rationally by values-driven board members and executives and readily adopted where they were seen 
to contribute to organisational effectiveness. 
Our analysis reveals and nuances the tensions between perceptions of external control and the 
learning logic within funders’ upward accountability processes. Despite formal funder encouragement, 
fieldworkers were frequently reluctant to report information contextualizing performance due to 
perceptions of a lack of funder reciprocity. Some fieldworkers felt that funders were more concerned 
to check that beneficiary engagements had actually taken place (i.e. control) as opposed to uncovering 
what had emerged from them (i.e. learning). This perceived limited voice for fieldworkers in the 
context of inadequate ‘committed listening’ by funders is consistent with long-standing concerns 
suggesting that funder support for participatory methods and the creation of learning environments 
may be co-opted by them as legitimising instruments. For example, it is often argued that this only 
gives the impression of an openness to key contextual information in development decision-making, 
while actual development practice remains largely ‘top-down’ and underpinned by a logic promoting 
the adoption of a host of exogenous reporting practices privileging objective, universal indicators 
divorced of context (Hall, 2014; Rahaman et al., 2010; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010).  
Our fieldworkers craved face-to-face personal interaction so that funders could be sensitised to 
the realities of lives, livelihoods and needs in an area. They were desperate to have a voice which 
could operate to achieve some ‘congruence of intent’ between their felt responsibilities to beneficiaries 
and the overall goals of funders. This informal interaction could not only assist in improving internal 
operations but might also assist fieldworkers to learn about their funders’ missions, goals and styles of 
working thereby enabling them to better understand the broader impact of their work. In essence, this 
desired interaction could create conditions conducive to enabling Fry’s (1995) conversations for 
accountability. The initiation of these conversations could also allow fieldworkers to understand better 
why funders adopted certain indicators and how their work fitted into a much bigger picture than the 
localised context they operated within. The perceptions that suggestions and contextualisations were 
entering a vacuum emphasise the importance of reciprocity and the need for both formal and informal 
communication if upward accountability processes are to facilitate informed on-the-ground efforts at 
achieving long term effectiveness. The perceived ‘history of exchange’ between funders and NGOs 
meant that the desire for contextual information communicated by funders was viewed suspiciously by 
many fieldworkers. However, these suspicions diminished as the closeness of relations fieldworkers 
experienced with funders increased during informal engagements where fieldworkers felt they had a 
voice (see also, Gray et al., 2006). As Eyben (2006) argues, “aid is a matter of relationships,” and aid 
can be more effective “when donors develop relationship-building skills as well as money 
management skills” (cited in Andrews, 2009, p. 11).  
The evolution in direct funder engagement with fieldworkers was starting to facilitate more 
open conversations. The positive disposition of fieldworkers towards these interactions, despite their 
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constrained nature, partly reflects their prior perceptions of funders as distant and hierarchical. It 
would appear that almost any signal that funders were willing engage directly with them on-the-
ground was seen as an opportunity to improve their effectiveness, no matter how minimal. 
‘Conversations for accountability’ had to commence somewhere and any potential opportunity needed 
to be seized upon if some sense of an alliance around accountability was to be aroused. This initial 
phase offered the potential for fieldworkers to engage in a form of negotiated accountability that could 
strengthen the existing limited enaction of professional/discretionary accountability (Kearns, 1994). 
While ‘conversations for accountability’ could also benefit funders, as they planned strategies to 
manage the constantly changing landscape of development funding, the extent to which funders were 
willing to engage in ‘committed listening’, particularly when formulating performance criteria, 
remained somewhat uncertain. Further research needs to be undertaken on how NGO fieldworkers and 
managers in developing countries may develop their strategic responses to funders’ requests. 
We recognise that our study was undertaken in the specific context of Northern Ghana and that 
it is therefore important to acknowledge that certain cultural characteristics may have impacted on 
how the fieldworkers experienced upward accountability processes. While highlighting this issue, we 
do not wish attach broad-based cultural characteristics to a small sample of fieldworkers. However, 
some related studies in Northern Ghana do help to contextualise our findings. For example, Yarrow 
(2008) argues that NGO workers from Northern Ghana have often identified themselves with the 
beneficiaries and the poverty they faced, having been born and brought up in Northern Ghanaian 
villages. Hence, many fieldworkers are seen to exhibit a moral commitment to working with and for 
“real people” (Yarrow, 2008, p. 352). Reciprocity is also considered an important trait in the Ghanaian 
culture and this may help explain why its absence was so acutely felt by the fieldworkers especially 
since personal relationships were also considered important by fieldworkers in allowing them to 
complete and more fully understand their work (Codjoe, 2003; Mohan, 2002; Yarrow, 2008). 
Moreover, Nelson et al. (2013) suggest that Ghanaian culture is quite hierarchical and that this often 
prevents ‘workers’ from stepping out of their bounds; an enlightening characteristic in light of the 
feeling of the need to comply with requests.  
The provision of aid funding for development purposes remains important and the need to 
ensure its effective use continues to be even more critical since many impoverished people depend on 
these resources for their existence. Our work, through illustrating how fieldworkers cope with the 
requirements of the upward accountability processes they encounter, has reinforced the significance of 
the needs of beneficiaries within performance assessment. It has also demonstrated a desire from both 
funders and fieldworkers for improvements in the accountability processes. Future research work that 
unveils how upward accountability reports are actually used by the receivers of these reports, the 
funders, is of utmost importance for developing a more complete understanding of how upward 








Agyemang, G., Awumbila, M. and O'Dwyer, B. (2009a), "A critical reflection on the use of focus 
groups as a research method: lessons from trying to hear the voices of NGO beneficiaries in 
Ghana", Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 4-16. 
Ahrens, T. and Chapman, C. S. (2004), "Accounting for Flexibility and Efficiency: A Field Study of 
Management Control Systems in a Restaurant Chain", Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 271-301. 
Andrews, N. (2009), "Foreign aid and development in Africa: What the literature says and what the 
reality is", Journal of African Studies and Development, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 8-15. 
Awio, G., Northcott, D. and Lawrence, S. (2011), "Social capital and accountability in grass-roots 
NGOs: The case of the Ugandan community-led HIV/AIDS initiative", Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 63-92. 
Cameron, J. (2000), "Focussing on the focus group", Qualitative Research Methods in Human 
Geography, pp. 83-102. 
Canadian International Development Agency (2011). “CIDA’S Aid Effectiveness Action Plan 2009-
2012”.Available at: 
http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/inet/images.nsf/vluimages/about_cida/$file/aideffectiveness_action
plan_2009-12-e.pdf.  Retrieved December 4, 2011. 
Chen, S. and Ravallion, M. (2008), "The developing world is poorer than we thought, but no less 
successful in the fight against poverty", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series. 
See:https://www.virtualstatisticalsystem.org/vss_uploads/The_Developing_World_is_Poorer_
than_we_Thought.pdf. Last accessed, May 26 2016. 
Chenhall, R. H., Hall, M. and Smith, D. (2013), "Performance measurement, modes of evaluation and 
the development of compromising accounts", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 38 
No. 4, pp. 268-287. 
Codjoe, H. M. (2003), "Is Culture the Obstacle to Development in Ghana? A Critique of the Culture-
Development Thesis as it Applies to Ghana and South Korea", Critical perspectives in 
political and socioeconomic development in Ghana, pp. 335-363. 
Cooper, D. J. and Morgan, W. (2008), "Case study research in accounting", Accounting Horizons, Vol. 
22 No. 2, pp. 159-178. 
DANIDA. (2006), "Monitoring at programme and project level- general issues ", Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Denmark (Ed.), Copenhagen. 
DANIDA. (2011), "Guidelines for Programme Management", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark  
(Ed.). DANIDA., Copenhagen. 
DANIDA. (2012), "Danida Evaluation Guidelines", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Ed.), 
Copenhagen. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2000), Handbook of qualitative research. , Sage. Thousand Oaks, 
CA 
DFID. (2005), "Guidance on evaluation and review for DFID staff", in DFID (Ed.), London. 
Dixon, R., Ritchie, J. and Siwale, J. (2006), "Microfinance: accountability from the grassroots", 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 415-427. 
Doz, Y. (2011), "Qualitative research for international business", Journal of International Business 
Studies, Vol. 42 No. 5, pp. 582-590. 
Ebrahim, A. (2002), "Information struggles: The role of information in the reproduction of NGO-
funder relationships", Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 84-114. 
Ebrahim, A. (2003), "'Accountability in practice: mechanisms for NGOs", World Development, Vol. 
31 (5), pp. 813-829. 
Ebrahim, A. (2005), "Accountability myopia: Losing sight of organisational learning", Nonprofit and 
voluntary sector quarterly, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 56-87. 
Ebrahim, A. (2009), "Placing the normative logics of accountability in “thick” perspective", American 
Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 52 No. 6, pp. 885-904. 
Ebrahim, A. and Rangan, V. K. (2010), "The limits of nonprofit impact: A contingency framework for 
measuring social performance", Harvard Business School. 
 23 
 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996), Beyond the magic bullet: NGO performance and accountability in 
the post-cold war world, Kumarian Press West Hartford, CT. 
Elbers, W. and Arts, B. (2011), "Keeping body and soul together: Southern NGOs’ strategic responses 
to donor constraints", International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 77 No. 4, pp. 713-
732. 
Englund, H. and Gerdin, J. (2014), "Developing Enabling Performance Measurement Systems: On the 
Interplay Between Numbers and Operational Knowledge", European Accounting Review, Vol. 
23, pp. 1-27. 
Everett, J. and Friesen, C. (2010), "Humanitarian accountability and performance in the Théâtre de 
l’Absurde", Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 21 No. 6, pp. 468-485. 
Eyben, R. (2006), Relationships for aid, Routledge. London 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011. Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation. Available at: 
http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-
_FINAL_EN.pdf. Retrieved: December 4th 2011 
Ferguson, J., Huysman, M. and Soekijad, M. (2010), "Knowledge management in practice: Pitfalls and 
potentials for development", World Development, Vol. 38 No. 12, pp. 1797-1810. 
Free, C. (2007), "Supply-Chain Accounting Practices in the UK Retail Sector: Enabling or Coercing 
Collaboration?*", Contemporary accounting research, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 897-933. 
Fry, R. E. (1995), "Accountability in organizational life: problem or opportunity for non-profits?", 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 181-195. 
Gray, R., Bebbington, J. and Collison, D. (2006), "NGOs, civil society and accountability: making the 
people accountable to capital", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 19 No. 3, 
pp. 319-348 
Ghana Statistical Services. 2014. see: http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/censuses.html. Accessed October 
24th 2014 
Hall, M. (2014), "Evaluation logics in the third sector", VOLUNTAS: International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 307-336. 
Huberman, A. M. and Miles, M. B. (1994), "Data management and analysis methods". In N.K. 
Denzin, and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage. 
Jordan, S. and Messner, M. (2012), "Enabling control and the problem of incomplete performance 
indicators", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 37 No. 8, pp. 544-564. 
Kearns, K. P. (1994), "The strategic management of accountability in nonprofit organizations: An 
analytical framework", Public Administration Review, pp. 185-192. 
Kitzinger, J. (2004), "The methodology of focus groups: the importance of interaction between 
research participants", in Seale, C. (Ed.), Social Research Methods: A Reader. Routledge, 
London and New York. 
KPMG ( 2010),  “A closer look: Attaining accountability in the development sector.” USA and 
Canada: KPMG International Development Services. 
Locke, K. (1996), "A Funny Thing Happened! The Management of Consumer Emotions in Service 
Encounters", Organization Science, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 40-59. 
Mohan, G. (2002), "The disappointments of civil society: the politics of NGO intervention in northern 
Ghana", Political Geography, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 125-154. 
Molund, S. and Schill, G. (2007), "Looking Back, Moving Forward, SIDA Evaluation Manual", SIDA 
Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit (Ed.). 
Morgan, D. L. (1996), "Focus groups", Annual Review of Sociology, pp. 129-152. 
Mulgan, R. (2000), "'Accountability': An ever-expanding concept?", Public Administration Review, 
Vol. 78 (3), pp. 553–573. 
 
Nelson, T., Ingols, C., Christian-Murtie, J. and Myers, P. (2013), "Susan Murcott and Pure Home 
Water: Building a Sustainable Mission-Driven Enterprise in Northern Ghana", 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 37 No. 4, pp. 961-979. 
 24 
 
O’Dwyer, B. and Unerman, J. (2008), "The paradox of greater NGO accountability: A case study of 
Amnesty Ireland", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 33 No. 7, pp. 801-824. 
O'Dwyer, B. and, Boomsma, R. (2015), "The co-construction of NGO accountability: Aligning 
imposed and felt accountability in NGO-funder accountability relationships", Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp.36-68 
O'Dwyer, B. and Unerman, J. (2007), "From Functional to Social Accountability: Transforming the 
Accountability Relationship between Funders and Non Governmental Development 
Organisations'", Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 20 (3), pp. 446-471. 
O'Dwyer, B. and Unerman, J. (2010), "Enhancing the role of accountability in promoting the rights of 
beneficiaries of development NGOs", Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 40 No. 5, pp. 
451-471. 
OECD. 2009. OECD. Stat Extracts Development ODA by Donor, DAC Countries [Online]. Paris: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE1 Retrieved: October 24th, 2014. 
OECD 2014. The Development Co-operation Report 2014. Available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report_20747721. Retrieved: October 
20th, 2014. 
Patton, M. Q. (2002), "Qualitative research and evaluation methods", . Sage, London. 
Porter, G. (2003), "NGOs and poverty reduction in a globalizing world: perspectives from Ghana", 
Progress in Development Studies, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 131-145. 
Prasad, A. and Prasad, P. (2002), "The coming of age of interpretive organizational research", 
Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 5, pp. 4-11. 
Krueger, R. (1994), " Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. ", Sage Publications., 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Rahaman, A., Neu, D. and Everett, J. (2010), "Accounting for Social-Purpose Alliances: Confronting 
the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa*", Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 
1093-1129. 
Roberts, J. (1991), "The possibilities of accountability", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 
16 No. 4, pp. 355-368. 
Ryan, G. W. and Bernard, H. R. (2003), "Techniques to identify themes", Field methods, Vol. 15 No. 
1, pp. 85-109. 
Saj, P. (2012), “The influence of mandatory requirements on voluntary performance reporting by large 
multi-service community service organisations”, Third Sector Review, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 139-
169. 
Silverman, D. (2010), Qualitative research, Sage. 
Silverman, D. (2013), Doing qualitative research: A practical handbook, Sage Publications Limited. 
Sinclair, A. (1995), "The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses", Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 219-237. 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the ACCRA Agenda for Action. 2011. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
Retrieved: October 24th, 2014. 
Townsend, J. G., Porter, G. and Mawdsley, E. (2004), "Creating spaces of resistance: development 
NGOs and their clients in Ghana, India and Mexico", Antipode, Vol. 36 No. 5, pp. 871-889. 
Unerman, J. and O'Dwyer, B. (2006), "On James Bond and the importance of NGO accountability'", 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 19 (3). 
United Nations (2011). The Millennium Development Goals Report. New York: United Nations. 
Wouters, M. and Roijmans, D. (2011), "Using Prototypes to Induce Experimentation and Knowledge 
Integration in the Development of Enabling Accounting Information", Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 708-736. 
Wouters, M. and Wilderom, C. (2008), "Developing performance-measurement systems as enabling 
formalization: A longitudinal field study of a logistics department", Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Vol. 33 No. 4, pp. 488-516. 
Yarrow, T. (2008), "Life/history: personal narratives of development amongst NGO workers and 
activists in Ghana", Africa, Vol. 78 No. 3, pp. 334-358. 
 25 
 
Yarrow, T. (2011), "Maintaining independence: the moral ambiguities of personal relations amongst 
Ghanaian Development Workers", in Inside the everyday lives of development workers: the 




Table 1: Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs) participating in the study 
   





Local small independent  Micro credit 3 
NGDO B 
 
INGDO (local branch) Agriculture 1 
NGDO C 
 
INGDO (local branch) Mental health  3 
NGDO D 
 
INGDO (local branch) Child sponsorship 4 
NGDO E 
 
Partner of local INGDO Water and sanitation 3 
NGDO F 
 
INGDO (local branch) Child literacy education 4 
NGDO G 
 
Local small independent Muslim education 3 
NGDO H 
 
INGDO (local branch) Support for disabled 3 
NGDO I 
 
Local small independent Poverty reduction 4 
NGDO J 
 
Partner of local INGDO Agriculture 1 
NGDO K 
 


























Disclosure  reports: 
Annual 
reports  
Yes Yes Yes Writte
n 













Performance evaluations (and assessments): 
Assessment 
Reports 
Yes Yes Yes Writte
n 
Continuous Funders  
Evaluation 
Reports 
Yes Yes Yes Writte
n  
At the end 





Yes Yes Yes Writte
n 
At the end 






Table 3: Example of commentary in an Interim Report 
 
Instructions for completing the form:  Please keep as brief as possible. Provide key information that 
may have a bearing on NGO work 
 
Sub-Heading Commentary 
Activity Capacity building workshop: Assertiveness Training 




Challenges Late disbursement of funds 
Outputs Number of women trained 





Table 4: A Final Project Evaluation Report Exemplar 
Headings in report 
 
Example of content included 
Introduction How report was developed; staff retreat, partnership review and 
reflection; team members; length of project 
 
Political, economic and 
social changes 
 
Ghana named as a member of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
Progress against project 
aims and objectives 
 
 
Aims identified; tables provided summarising NGO interventions; 
each objective defined and progress analysed; learning highlighted for 
each objective  





Details about the NGDO 
The future of the 
programme 
 
Plans for the future; direction of new work  
Challenges 
 
Resource constraints; limited capacity of partners; poor road networks 
 
